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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues raised by the Appellant on appeal are: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment was defective, 
in that it was not supported by appropriate affidavits or 
other factual material as required by Rule 56, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
2a. There exist genuine issues of material fact 
which were not addressed in the Respondents Motion which 
prevent the Court from entering summary judgment. 
2b. There exist genuine issues of material fact 
which prevent summary judgment which were presented to the 
trial court in opposition to the motion. These include 
facts identified in the affidavit of an expert presented 
in opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The affidavit is legally sufficient to prevent 
the entry of summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent American Concept Insurance Company ("the 
Insurance Company") insured the Appellants (the Lochheads) 
with a homeowners policy. The Lochheads suffered a fire. 
The Insurance Company paid the Lochheads for certain of 
their damages, but declined to pay other sums submitted by 
the Lochheads. 
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The matter was submitted to arbitration. Pursuant to 
the arbitration provisions of the insurance agreement, 
three arbitrators were appointed. The arbitrators reached 
their decision which was entered unanimously. The 
arbitration provisions of the insurance contract only 
required that two of the three arbitrators concur in the 
decision. After the arbitrators had issued their award, 
the Insurance Company declined to pay. It approached the 
arbitrator whom it had selected and persuaded him to 
recant. It then commenced the action in the lower court 
to vacate the arbitration award. The lower court 
correctly ruled on summary judgment for the Lochheads 
that, even though one arbitrator had recanted, the 
two-thirds majority provision of the insurance contract 
prevented reopening the arbitration. 
The Lochheads filed a counterclaim in the action in 
the lower court, asserting claims for breach of contract, 
bad faith, violation of the duty to deal in good faith, 
consequential damages, intentional damage to Mr. 
Lochheadfs business relationships, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress resulting in physical 
injuries. 
The Insurance Company brought a Motion for Summary 
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Judgment on the Lochheads Counterclaim. The Insurance 
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment was not accompanied 
by affidavits and did not specify any provision in any 
other factual documentation which supported its position. 
The Lochheads opposed the motion with the affidavit of an 
expert witness. The lower court granted the Insurance 
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment, without having 
stricken the affidavit, on the grounds that the affidavit 
did not raise issues of fact. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order to prevail on summary judgment, the 
Insurance Company was required to establish that there was 
no genuine issue of material fact. It had to do this by 
establishing relevant uncontroverted facts through 
affidavits, depositions, requests for admission, or 
otherwise. The Insurance Company failed to provide 
affidavits or to cite portions of the record in its 
memorandum which were within the purview of Rule 56. 
Had the Insurance Company filed affidavits, the 
Lochheads did not need to provide affidavits in response, 
since the Insurance Company failed to establish that it 
was entitled to summary judgment. 
The affidavit provided by the Lochheads in response 
to the Insurance Company's motion was legally sufficient. 
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The affidavit set forth sufficient facts to allow the 
affiant to be deemed an expert under applicable law. As 
an expert, the affiant's opinion becomes a fact submitted 
to the court. That opinion need not be supported, in the 
affidavit, by the facts upon which the expert relies. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WAS NOT PROPERLY SUPPORTED, AS 
REQUIRED BY RULE 56. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, at 
subsection (c), in relevant part, 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 2 of the Third Judicial District Court Rules of 
Practice provides, at subsection (g), 
The points and authorities in support of a 
disposative motion shall begin with a section 
that contains a concise statement of material 
facts as to which the movant contends no genuine 
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences, and shall refer 
with particularity to those portions of the 
records upon which the movant relies, (emphasis 
added) 
The Insurance Company's memorandum in support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment identified nine specific items 
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in its "statement of facts." (R 117-119) None of these 
"facts" were identified to the record, nor was an 
affidavit submitted. 
The Lochhead's Counterclaim (R 39-44) complied with 
the notice pleading requirements of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See Rules 8(a) and 84, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. That counterclaim set forth its basic 
factual allegations in paragraphs numbered 1 through 7, 
and then set forth various causes of action in the 
paragraphs which followed. Paragraph 8 claimed $4,500.00 
for loss to the structure and $61,970.00 for loss to the 
contents. Paragraph 11 alleged five independent causes of 
action. They were, specifically, a) loss arising out of 
the Lochheads' inability to repair or replace damaged 
property; b) enhanced damage to the Lochheads1 property 
caused by the Insurance Company's delay; c) damage to Paul 
Lochhead's business resulting from overt actions of the 
Insurance Company; d) damages relating to humiliation and 
embarrassment from the Insurance Company's actions; and e) 
damages relating to mental, emotional and physical 
distress. Each of these are cognizable actions in the 
State of Utah. 
The Insurance Company's memorandum in support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment argued that the Lochheads 
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failed to state a cause of action for "bad faith." It 
cited Beck vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 
(Utah, 1985) (R-119), and argued, in its memorandum, that 
the Lochheads may not prevail unless they can prove the 
action was instituted without just cause or excuse. They 
then cited cases from sister states arguing the bad faith 
issue. 
Had the Lochheads1 claim been solely based on bad 
faith, as the Insurance Company would have had the lower 
court believe, the Insurance Companyfs position may have 
had some merit. The Lochheads1 Counterclaim was not that 
limited. The damages identified in the body of the 
Lochheads1 Counterclaim were clearly cognizable in Utah 
under Beck. Subparagraphs 11(a) and 1Kb) (R-41) sought 
consequential damages arising out of the breach of the 
contract. Beck provides 
... there is no reason to limit damages 
recoverable for breach of duty to investigate, 
bargain and settle in good faith to the amount 
specified in the insurance policy. Nothing 
inherent in the contract law approach mandates 
this narrow definition of recoverable damages. 
Although the policy limits define the amount for 
which the insurer may be held responsible in 
performing the contract, they do not define the 
amount for which it may be liable upon a breach. 
Id. at 801. 
This court then cited several cases for the proposition, 
We have repeatedly recognized that consequential 
damages for breach of contract may reach beyond 
the bare contact terms. Id. 
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Subparagraphs 11(c), (d) and (e) of the Lochheads1 
Counterclaim (R-41) stated causes of action for 
independent torts. Independent torts were also recognized 
in Beck. This court said, at 802f 
... We find no difficulty with the proposition 
that, in unusual cases, damages for mental 
anguish might be provable. 
Subparagraph 11(e) stated a cause of action for mental and 
emotional anguish and attendant physical damages. 
Subparagraphs (c) and (d) stated causes of action for 
other recognized torts. Surely this court did not intend, 
in Beck, to indicate that a breach of contract between an 
insurance company and an insured bars recovery for 
independent torts, other than the mental anguish claim 
allowed at page 802, merely because the parties happen to 
have a contractual relationship. Allowing the mental 
anguish claim indicates that other previously recognized 
tort actions lie. 
Nothing in the Insurance Company's motion, memorandum 
or in its argument at the time of the hearing, so far as 
that argument can be reconstructed (R 172-178), reflected 
any factual basis for summary judgment on the claims 
alleged in paragraphs 8 and 11 of the Lochheads1 
Counterclaim. 
This case resembles Pentecost vs. Harward, 699 P.2d 
696 (Utah, 1985) on this issue. In Pentecost, the lower 
court was reversed when it granted summary judgment on 
issues which had been plead but not addressed in moving 
for summary judgment. 
The "Statement of Facts" contained in the Insurance 
Company's memorandum did not address any of these issues, 
with or without the citations to the record required by 
the local rules. Rule 56 requires, for good reason, that 
a motion for summary judgment must be supported by facts. 
The criteria for such a motion is that "... there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact..." Rule 56(c). 
Nothing in the Insurance Company's motion or supporting 
document rose to that level. 
II. 
LOCHHEADS' RESPONSE TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY'S 
MOTION WAS SUFFICIENT. 
A. 
LOCHHEADS DID NOT NEED AFFIDAVITS TO REBUT THE 
INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION. 
It appears that the motion turned upon the 
sufficiency of the Affidavit of Milton Beck submitted by 
the Lochheads in response to the Insurance Company's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Counsel for the Insurance 
Company stated, at the time of the hearing on Plaintiff's 
objection to the form of Defendant's motion for proposed 
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summary judgment, 
This Court did not rule that the question of bad 
faith in this jurisdiction as a general 
proposition is a question of law for the Court 
and not a question of fact. What the Court 
ruled is that affidavits submitted by Mr. Beck 
could not create an issue of fact. As the Court 
may well recall, I objected to that affidavit 
and moved to have it stricken at the time of the 
oral argument, because it simply was not 
admissible under Rule 56 as an affidavit. (R-174 
line 22 - 175 line 2) 
The affidavit was not stricken. (R-177 line 8) Relying on 
the interpretation of the lower court's ruling, it appears 
that the motion was denied based on a presumed necessity 
for and insufficiency of Mr. Beck's affidavit. 
Rule 56(e) provides, in relevant part, 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does 
not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(emphasis added) 
Rule 56(e) shows that summary judgment may not be entered, 
regardless of the submission of opposing affidavits, if it 
is not appropriate. Rule 56(c) provides for judgment only 
if the moving party is able to 
... show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
(emphasis added) 
It is unnecessary to provide opposing affidavits in the 
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face of a motion for summary judgment if the moving party 
fails to show that judgment is appropriate and that it is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah case law supports this position. 
Summary judgment is proper only if the 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and 
admissions show that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
[citation omitted]. If there is any doubt or 
uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the 
doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
opposing party. Thus, the court must evaluate 
all the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment. 
... It was, therefore, unnecessary for 
defendants to submit opposing affidavits as to 
this issue in order to comply with Rule 56(e), 
supra, because the issue was sufficiently raised 
in their answer and motion to dismiss and was 
uncontroverted by Lockhart1s affidavits. 
Lockhart Co. vs. Equitable Realty Co., 657 P.2d 1333, 1335 
(Utah, 1983). The United States Supreme Court issued a 
similar interpretation of Rule 56. 
"... where the evidentiary matter in support of 
the motion does not establish the absence of a 
genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied 
even if no opposing evidentiary matter is 
presented." Because respondent did not meet its 
initial burden of establishing the absence of a 
policeman in the store, petitioner here was not 
required to come forward with suitable opposing 
affidavits, (emphasis added) 
Adickes vs. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160, 26 L.Ed.2d 
142, 155, 90 S.Ct. 1598 (1970). 
As shown in the first section of argument of this 
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brief, the Insurance Company failed to provide anything 
which would establish that it was entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Accordingly, the failure of the 
Lochheads to submit affidavits would not have entitled the 
Insurance Company to judgment. There remained genuine 
issues of material fact, and the judgment of the lower 
court must be reversed. 
B. 
MILTON BECK'S AFFIDAVIT WAS SUFFICIENT. 
The foregoing subsection of this argument shows that 
the Insurance Company would not have been entitled to 
judgment, even had no affidavit been submitted. The 
Lochheads did, however, file an affidavit in opposition to 
the Insurance Company's motion for judgment. That 
affidavit was the Affidavit of Milton Q. Beck (R 130-133). 
The affidavit was not stricken. (R-174, 177) With the 
affidavit in the file and unstricken, the lower court 
should have given it credence. 
The Insurance Company's position was that the 
affidavit was legally insufficient to meet the 
requirements of Rule 56(e). This is incorrect. 
The affidavit of Mr. Beck established, in paragraphs 
1, 2, 3 and 4 (R 130-131), that he was an expert in the 
insurance adjustment industry. Paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 laid 
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foundation for the opinions expressed in the remaining 
paragraphs of the affidavit. Nothing was filed in 
response to Mr. Beck's affidavit which would vitiate Mr. 
Beck's credentials or other foundation. The evidence 
contained in Mr. Beck's affidavit is admissible under 
Article 7 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 703 
provides, 
The facts or data in a particular case upon 
which an expert bases an opinion or inference 
may be those perceived by him or made known to 
him at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field informing opinions or 
inferences upon the subjectf the facts or data 
need not be admissible in evidence. 
The foundation paragraphs of Mr. Beck's affidavit show 
that, in fact, he was relying upon evidence of the nature 
described in Rule 703. Rule 705 is also applicable. 
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or 
inference and give his reasons therefor without 
prior disclosure of the underlying facts or 
data, unless the court requires otherwise. The 
expert may, in any event, be required to 
disclose the underlying facts or data on 
cross-examination. 
Mr. Beck's testimony is cognizable in the form contained 
in his affidavit. The fact that the Insurance Company did 
not receive the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Beck begs 
the question. The issue is whether or not Mr. Beck's 
affidavit has provided evidence which raises a genuine 
issue as to a material fact. Mr. Beck's testimony is of 
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the category described in Breidor vs. Sears Roebuck and 
Company, 722 F.2d 1134, 1139 (3d Cir., 1983). 
Where there is a logical basis for an expert's 
opinion testimony, the credibility and weight of 
that testimony is to be determined by the jury, 
not the judge. 
In other words, the affidavit establishes an issue of fact 
causing the entire matter to be reserved for trial. 
... it only takes one sworn statement under oath 
to dispute the averments on the other side of 
the controversy and create an issue of fact. 
This is analogous to the elemental rule that the 
fact trier may believe one witness as against 
many, or many against one. 
Holbrook Company vs. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah, 
1975). In other words, expert testimony presented to the 
court with proper foundation constitutes an issue of fact 
which removes the case from the category of those 
appropriate for summary judgment. Rule 703 is not limited 
in scope, as the 6th Circuit pointed out in Mannino vs. 
International Manufacturing Company, 650 F.2d 846, 853, 
(1st Cir., 1981), 
Great liberality is allowed the expert in 
determining the basis of his opinions under Rule 
703. 
The affidavit submitted by the Lochheads in 
opposition to the Insurance Company's motion was legally 
sufficient under Article 7 of the Rules of Evidence. The 
fact that it contained evidence in the form of opinions 
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does not make it inadmissible. Opinion testimony is 
allowed by the Rules of Evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the lower court and remand 
this action for trial. The Complaint alleged numerous 
causes of action; only one was addressed in the Insurance 
Company's motion. Numerous issues of fact remain, whether 
credence is given to Mr. Beck's affidavit or not. This is 
not a proper matter for summary judgment, and should be 
sent back for trial. 
DATED this ~ZL- day of March, 1987. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the !Z- -day of March, 1987, 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellants1 
Brief were hand-delivered to the office of: 
Dennis C. Ferguson, Esq. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
, C'erk^I DK*-Court 
outy oierk 
AMERICAN CONCEPT INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL and PENNY LOCHHEAD, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. M84-23 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came on 
regularly for hearing and decision before the 
above-entitled Court on August 5, 1986. Plaintiff 
appeared by and through its counsel, Dennis C. Ferguson; 
defendants appeared by and through their counsel, Arron F. 
Jepson. The Court, being fully advised in the premises, 
having reviewed the pleadings and memoranda on file and 
having heard and considered the oral argument of counsel 
for both parties, and it appearing that there are no 
material issues of fact, and that plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on defendants1 Counterclaim, 
QG' .0*' 
fcS 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Summary Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff 
and against defendants, no cause of action, and the 
defendants1 Counterclaim and action are hereby dismissed, 
with prejudice. If) fj 
DATED this y day of _Aujgjjs-t-r-1986. 
BY THE CQURT: 
/ R i ' •RictfSrd/H. J fo f fa t 
D i s t r i c t j j i ^ge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
m, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
D e n n i s C. F e r g u s o n 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a in t \L£f 
ATTEST 
H DIXON HINDLEY 
eputy Clerk 
0 o°^ 
it 
> ( * fi 
Anthony M. Thurber 
Attorney for Defendants 
211 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 533-0181 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN CONCEPT INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PAUL LOCHHEAD and PENNY 
LOCHHEAD, 
Defendants, 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Case No. M84-23 
Honorable Dean E. Conder 
Defendants by way of counterclaim against plaintiff 
complain and for cause of action allege: 
1. That at all times material herein, defendants were 
insureds of plaintiff under a policy of home owner's insurance 
numbered H-11791 insuring defendants and defendants1 residence 
located at 1626 East Springrun in Salt Lake City, Utah, against 
various risks, including risk of a loss and damage to structure 
and contents by fire. 
2. That on or about October 18, 1983, an insured loss 
occurred at that address. 
OC-0023 
3. That defendants have complied with each and every 
condition precedent to plaintiff's obligation to pay defendants1 
insured loss. 
4. That disagreement between the parties arose 
concerning the amount of loss and pursuant to the terms of the 
subject policy/ an appraisal proceeding was held January 14/ 1984 
wherein Kenneth Sorenson participated as appraiser for 
defendants, Donald A. Laursen as appraiser for plaintiff, and 
Eugene Peterson as umpire. 
5. That at the conclusion of the appraisal proceeding, 
the appraisers and umpire participating therein voluntarily 
executed awards in favor of defendants representing the actual 
cash value of the structure and contents lost and damaged by 
reason of the fire which occurred on or about October 18, 1983. 
6. That plaintiff has failed to pay in its entirety the 
award which was rendered with respect to the structure loss, and 
has failed totally to pay the appraisers1 and umpire's contents 
award of $61,970.00, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A". 
7. That the plaintiff's applicable limit of coverage 
under its policy of insurance with respect to contents is 
$62,998.10. 
8. That plaintiff is indebted to defendants under and 
by reason of the structure award in the remaining amount of 
-
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$4,500.00, and under and by reason of the contents award in the 
amount of $61,970-00. 
9. That plaintiff as defendants1 insurer at all times 
during the continuance of the relationship, owed defendants 
duties independent of the written contract of insurance to deal 
fairly and in good faith in the investigation, adjustment, and 
payment of defendants' insured losses. 
10. That plaintiff's conduct in failing, neglecting and 
refusing to pay all or any portion of defendants' insured losses 
constitutes material breaches of plaintiff's duties of good faith 
and fair dealing as defendants' insurer. 
11. That defendants have been compensably damaged as a 
direct and proximate result of plaintiff's breaches of legal 
duties aforesaid, in the following particulars inter alia; 
a. Inability to repair or replace the damaged 
property. 
b. Damage to defendants' property has progressed or 
worsened by reason of delay in repair or replacement necessitated 
by plaintiff's nonpayment. 
c. Damage to defendant Paul Lochhead's insurance 
business and clientele as independent agent of plaintiff insurer 
resulting from plaintiff's wrongful and bad faith conduct both 
toward defendants and said defendant's other insureds with 
plaintiff insurer. 
-3-
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d. defendants1 inconvenience and humiliation in 
being deprived of their lost and damaged home contents by reason 
of plaintiff's enumerated refusal to pay. 
e. Mental/ emotional, social and physical distress, 
anguish and injury. 
12. That defendants have as a direct and proximate 
result of plaintiff's wrongful acts and omissions aforesaid 
suffered and sustained both special and general damages 
additional to plaintiff's contractual obligation in amount to be 
determined by the trier of fact. 
13. That plaintiff's conduct not only constitutes 
material breaches of plaintiff's duties of good faith and fair 
dealing, but have been done wilfully, intentionally and/or with 
deliberate disregard to the rights and property of others, by 
reason whereof defendants are entitled to an ciward of punitive or 
exemplary damages against plaintiff by way of punishment, to 
serve as an example to others inclined to engage in similar 
conduct, and to discourage its repetition. 
14. That defendants are by contractual agreement between 
the parties entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees 
together with the costs of this action. 
15. That defendants are further entitled to an award of 
interest at the maximum statutory rate of 12% per annum from the 
date of loss (October 18, 1983) to the date oE judgment upon all 
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contractual obligations found due and owing by plaintiff to 
defendants. 
WHEREFORE/ defendants demand judgment against plaintiff 
as follows: 
1. In the amount of unpaid appraisal awards in favor of 
defendants and against plaintiff in the respective amounts of 
$4/500.00 with regard to structure, and $61/970.00 with regard to 
contents. 
2. For interest thereon at the maximum statutory rate 
of 12% per annum from October 18/ 1983 to the date of judgment. 
3. For special and general damages resulting from 
plaintiff's breach of legal duties of good faith and fair dealing 
in amount to be determined by the trier of fact. 
4. For punitive or exemplary damages in amount to be 
determined by the trier of fact. 
5. For a reasonable attorney1s fee. 
6. For costs of court and such additional relief as to 
the court seems just and proper. 
DATED this «%/ day of October, 1984. 
Anthony M. Thurber 
Attorney for Defendants 
• 5 -
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Counterclaim this t,f day of October/ 1984, 
with postage prepaid thereon, at Salt Lake City, Utah, to Dennis 
C. Ferguson, Esq., Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
plaintiff, P.O. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110. 
•6-
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UKTY OF 5^r i^^ J SS. 
We, the undersigned, do solemnly s*ear thAt we will act with stric^ixnri£jLLiality in making an apprainoment of the actual 
h value and the amount of loss upon the proper*} hereinbefore mej^OTe^m accordance with the foregoing appointment, and 
I we will make a true, just and conscientious / y a r d ^ f the sanx\ according to the best of our knowledge, skill and judgment. We 
not related to the Insured, either as creditors/)/otr/eryise, a-fad y/i\6\ interested in said property or the insurance thereon. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
APPRAISERS 
Notary Pubhr 
SELECTION OF UMP1R 
We, the undersigned, hereby select >Dd appoint. <£ *»n. 
[R fiT***-***^ 
act as umpire to settle matters of difference that shall exist between us, if any, by reason of and in compliance with the foregoing 
morandum and appointment. 
Witness our hands this .day of 
'ATE O F . 
3UNTY OF 
QUALIFICATJONOF UMPIRE 
.1 
) SS. 
I, the undersigned, hereby accept the appointment of umpire, as provided in the foregoing agreement, and solemnly swear 
at J will act with strict impartiality in all matters of difference that shall be submitted to me in connection with this appointment, 
d I will make a true, just and conscientious award, according to the besl of my knowledge, skill and judgment. J am not related to 
iy of the parties to this memorandum nor interested as a creditor or otherwise in said property or insurant. 
^ - ^ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this . .day of . 1 8 . 
y <^s' 
s- >r- /, * NoUxy Public 
AWARD 
We, the undersigned, pursuant to the within appointment, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that we have truly and conscientiously 
rformed the duties assigned to us, agreeably to the foregoing stipulations, and h*\» appraised and determined and do hereby 
•ard as the actual cash value of said property on the / ,TST day of £2><Z /& iz*df** 19 ^ w 
d the amount of loss thereto by on that day, the following sums, to wit: 
C- TTFM Prtn^~<Y c- Pte-t*^hy 
ITEM 
ITEM 
ITEM 
ITEM 
ITEM . ... 
TOTAL ACTUAL CASH VALUE AND TOTAL AMOUNT OF LOSS | 
ACTUAL CASH V A L U E 
&i qic 
(rt 4 7 6 
• — 
i 
AMOUNT OF LOSS 
I 6/9?o 
1 
1 
II 1 
I 1 
— \(P/97O 
— 
Witness our hands this '* ~ **yf*fJ * I *'*' ^ ^ ' ^ .19. *y 
w rt-vscooNi Y.UTAH 
AUG I 2 23 PH'85 
Anthony M. Thurber (#A3261) 
Attorney for Defendants 
Suite 735 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 533-0181 
H. OiXOH HI.HBLEY 0 l E R l L r ~ - * » 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN CONCEPT INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL AND PENNY LOCHHEAD, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MILTON Q. BECK 
Civil No. M84-23 
Judge Dean E. Conder 
Milton Q. Beck being first duly sworn upon his oath 
proposes and states: 
1. He is currently licensed as a public insurance 
adjuster within the state of Utah. 
2. He has in excess of 15 years experience as claims 
manager of a property and casualty insurer transacting business 
nationwide and within the state of Utah. 
3. He has qualified as a expert witness in the courts 
of this state and testified as such in cases involving questions 
O^ 
A ^ 0 
of good faith in the investigation and adjustment of insured 
property and casualty losses. 
4. He is the former insurance claims manager whose 
affidavit is mentioned and relied upon by the Utah Supreme.Court 
in the recent landmark decision of Beck vs. Farmers, 12 Utah 
Advanced Reports (3) filed 1985. 
5. He has reviewed the pleadings, depositions, trial 
testimony transcripts, adjuster's file and other materials 
relevant to the conduct of the plaintiff's insurer which is the 
subject matter of this litigation. 
6. He is'acquainted with the applicable standards of 
good faith and fair dealing implicit in the insurance contract 
between the parties to this action and delineated by the Beck vs. 
Farmers decision. 
7. From the materials examined it is his opinion as a 
expert in the field that the documented conduct of the plaintiff 
insurer toward defendants as its insured presents abundant 
evidence of the insurer's failure to satisfy its legal duties of 
good faith and fair dealing in the investigation and adjustment 
of defendant's insured loss. 
8. He is prepared to testify in detail concerning 
each specific instance of plaintiff's failure to satisfy the 
aforesaid legal duties, of which instances there are many 
disclosed by the materials reviewd. 
o 
- 2 -
9. It is his opinion as a former property and 
casualty claims manager with many years experience, and a 
qualified expert witness in the field, that this case represents 
one of the most egregious and outrageous examples of an insurer's 
failure to satisfy its duties and good faith and fair dealing 
that he has encountered in his many years of insurance 
experience. 
10. Correspondence in the adjuster's file produced at 
the time of his deposition discloses that plaintiff did not 
reasonably believe it had a viable legal basis for modification 
or vacating the appraiser's award, but determined to commence 
this action against defendants as their insureds for the purpose 
of delaying payment of the claim, causing the insureds to incur 
additional expense, and to teach the insured and the insured's 
public adjuster a lesson. 
11. It is my opinion that considering the facts of 
this case a grave injustice would result in the event plaintiff 
is allowed to escape with payment of nothing more than the basic 
claim. 
DATED this J / day of July, 1986. 
Milton Q. Beck 
QJOV 
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VERIFICATION 
Milton Q. Beck, affiant above named, hereby certifies 
that he has read the foregoing Affidavit and that the same is 
true according to his best knowledge, information and belief. 
Milton Q 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
)ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 7/ day of 
July, 1986. 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Affidavit of Milton Q. Beck in the above 
referenced matter with postage fully prepaid, this :j l<5f day of 
July, 1986 to the following: 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-
// }{/t/lfrVl&t 
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IN THE DISTRICTJ COURT OF THE THIRD 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE C 
STATE OF UTAH 
DICIAL DISTRICT 
NTY 
—oOo— 
AMERICAN CONCEPT INS. 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS 
PAUL & PENNY LOCHHEAD, 
Defendants. 
M-34-23 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO FORM 
OF DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED SUMMARt 
JUDGEMENT AND MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on October 31st, 1936, the above-
captioned cause came on regularly for hearing before the 
HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, one of the Judges -»of the above-
named Court. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendants: 
MR. DENNIS C. FERGUS pis 
Attorney At Law 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah! 
MR. ROBERT H. WILDE 
Attorney At Law 
6925 Union Park Center 
Draper, Utah S4047 
FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utan 
JAM -51387 -
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WHEREUPON the following proceedings were had: 
MR. WILDE: Robert H. Wilde for the Defendants, 
frhis is our hearing and our objections to the proposed form of 
[judgement. The Court may recall that in this action the Court 
entered Summary Judgement against my client on their bad faith 
claim against the Plaintiff insurance company. And at that 
time my clients were represented by their previous counsel, 
jwho for whatever reason, failed to hcive the argument reported. 
And following the Court's ruling, the insurance 
[company, through their counsel, submitted their order for 
(Summary Judgement, which says in itfe effective language, 
" Summary Judgement is hereby entered in favor of the Plaintif 
knd against the Defendant, no cause of action. And the 
[Defendant's Counter-claim then is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice." Had the action in effect been reported, then the 
transcript would have contained the Court's reasoning for that 
[particular ruling. 
Not having been counsel for my client at that point i 
[time, I was not here. I understand, from conversations with m 
clients and with their former counsel, that the Court's 
reasoning in that matter was, that the Court could decide, ass 
a matter of law and that there was in fact no bad faith 
•Involved here. There were no affidavits submitted on the part 
pf the insurance company;and Mr. Thurber's position, apparentl 
(is, that presumably, the Court's reason is, that there is no 
such thing as an action for bad faith in the State of Utah* 
That is not contained in the record, though I under-
stand at the hearing, there was some discussion by the Court 
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for the basis -for the reason. The proposal that we 
have made is, that the Summary Judgement contain language as 
follows: The determination of what the Plaintiff's actios or 
inactions constitute bad faith as an issue of law and not of 
fact and Summary Judgement is hereby entered in favor of 
Plaintiffs and against the Defendants, so on, of no cause of 
action. 
We think that it would be just to allow this amendmenj 
so that we would be able to know for the basis of an appeal, 
the reasoning of the Court in granting the Summary Judgement 
against our clients. And had, as I indicated, a transcript 
been prepared before, this would not be necessary. But since 
no such transcript was prepared, we think that the record as 
abbreviated as it will be, ought to reflect the Court's 
reasoning, which will not be done if Summary Judgement is 
entered in the form that it has been submitted by the insuranc} 
companies* counsel. 
MR. FERGUSON: May it please the Court, Your Honor. 
|Let me start by indicating to the Court, that I think the orde[r 
as prepared by Mr. Wilde is clearly erroneous and an attempt 
(to sabotage both the Summary Judgement and this Court's rulingl 
This Court did not rule that the question of bad faith 
in this jurisdiction 4s a general proposition is a question of] 
law £or the Court and not a fact.__What the Court ruled is, 
|that the affidavits submitted by Mr. Beck did not create'an 
issue of fact. As the Court may well recall, I objected to 
[that affidavit and moved to have it stricken at the time of thje 
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oral argument, because it simply was not admissabla 
under Rule 56 as an affidavit. It simply recited some general) 
statements that after reviewing all of the records, Mr. Beck 
thought that there was bad faith in this^case. 
The questions and the issues were presented in a trial 
held before Judge Conder, in which was cited in the memos, whi| 
the Court was able to review and read, and to say that we're 
|going up on an abreviated record is simply not true. 
The order submitted by me states, and I think it's in] 
the standard form of a Summary Judgment, that the Court being 
fully advised in the premises, having reviewed the Pleadings 
and Memoranda on file, and having heard and considered the 
oral argument of counsel for both parties, appearing,there 
|were no material issues of fact;and that the Plaintiff lis 
entitled to judgement as a matter of law. And Defendant's 
Counter-claim then goes on to recite the Summary Judgement is 
granted. I think the Summary Judgement form is perfectly deal 
With regard to Mr. Wilde's complaint that the argumerJ 
[was not reported. I submit to the Court, that although I agrej 
completely with the Court's rationale for it's ruling in this 
case , I am entitled to sustain the Summary Judgement on any 
grounds, regardless of what the Court's rationale is;and I 
don't think the argument is going to be limited unnecessarily 
to what the Court's rationale for the ruling was. It's a 
correct ruling. The Summary Judgment order that I prepared, 
correctly reflects what the Court did. And I urge the Court t 
sign that order and not Mr. Wilde's. Thank you. 
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THE COURT: Your position is, I was correct, no 
matter how it got there. 
MR." FERGUS ON s~lr. That ts -right; is., 
THE COURT: _That happens often. 
MR. WILDE: We'll concur with that as long as you 
rule in our favor. 
THE COURT: Most people do. 
MR. WILDE: I have reviewed the record and obtaine4 
a copy of the Court's file and see nothing in there that is a 
ruling on Mr. Beck's affidavit;and whether we're talking abou^ 
an action against the insurance company or future actions 
against other people, I think it's important that that be in 
there. This is the first I have heard of that particular 
ruling. As I indicated to the Court in my initial argument 
here, I was not present. I don't know what went on and if I 
misconstrued the facts, I apologize both to the Court and 
counsel. Those are the facts given to me by prior counsel. 
If in fact that affidavit was -stricken, then it would be good 
to have some record of that in the file. 
THE COURT: You guys don't have the unfortunate 
problem the Court has, that is we have seven copies of every-
thing and no copies of other things, and nothing is indexed. 
Just a tribulation of being a Judge. I do find that there wa^ 
a Defendant's objection to the proposed form of judgement and 
that objection was granted back in September, am I correct? 
MR. FERGUSON: Right, Your Honor. --As the Court may 
recall, we had a pre-trial scheduled the day after the Motion 
5 
1 and I showed up at the pre-trial to argue the motion* I 
2 came in and saw the Court and since then I filed an objection 
3 to the proposed order that Mr. Wilde had prepared pursuant to 
4 that order. I think the issue is properly before the Court. 
5 THE COURT: I do too, 
6 MR. WILDE: I don't know the ruling on Mr. Beck's 
7 affidavit. Counsel indicated he moved to have it stricken. 
8 MR. FERGUSON: Don't think it was stricken, Your 
9 Honor. What the Court agreed was, Your Honor, that it was 
10 the the opinions in there did not raise issues of fact;simply 
11 opinions as to what Mr. Beck thought the law was or ought to tj 
12 THE COURT: Well, it's unfair for you,: -to make me hq 
13 the memory on this, but I do recall the argument, but not in 
14 detail. I think that was the position I took, that the 
15 affidavit didn't contain anything that would create an issue 
16 of fact. 
17 MR. WILDE: Our position is, in the interests of 
18 justice, admittedly people hire their attornies and are 
19 generally bound by them. I think, with no stress on the 
20 I system at all, In the interests of justice, the Court could 
21 I elucidate a little more clearly in his order;in this instance 
22 defining the issues on appeal and resolve-what are a lot of 
23 problems. We would submit lit. 
24 MR. FERGUSON: Well, Your Honor, don't want to 
25 I belabor this, but the affidavit is filed and the affidavit 
will go up to the Supreme Court. If Mr. Wilde intends to 
appeal the motion, the memoranda are all on file. And the 
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Court held, that considering all of that, there was 
no issue of fact created. I don't know what else has to be 
elucidated. 
THE COURT: I don't in fact either, Mr. Wilde. None 
of the circumstances;seems to me that the matter is in proper 
form for you to take such further steps as you wish to, there] 
[-fore, the Plaintiff's objection to the Defendant's proposed 
form of Summary Judgement is sustained or granted and the 
[proposed order as submitted by the Plaintiff, will be the 
order that will be entered. 
MR. FERGUSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR'.,-WILDE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(WHEREUPON this hearing was concluded.) 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
SALT LAKE COUNTY \
 s s 
STATE OF UTAH } 
I, Hal M. Walton, do hereby certify that I am a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter of the Stateof Utah;that on 
October 31st, 1986 I appeared before the above-named Court 
and reported in Stenotype the preceeding seven pages of 
transcript and that the same are a true and correct transcrip 
-tion of my shorthand notes as reported by me. 
y 
Dated: December 1, 1986 
V H.xM. Walton C.S.R. 
OCOX' «7S 
Kules of Civil Procedure UTAH f OD5. J2&J9IJ-C 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, £ 
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file 
with the court a like memorandum thereof duly. 
fc verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the jtems 
are correct, and that the disbursements have been 
necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A 
m party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within 
seven days after service of the memorandum of\ 
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by^  
. the court in which the judgment was rendered." \^C >*'r 
* T: A memorandum of costs served and filed after the 
verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the findings of fact and concl-
usions of law, but before the entry of judgment,' 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed 
'. on the date judgment is entered. ^ * '"/ Z~ /_*•- . 
_(3)-(4) Repealed. January .1 , ; , 1985. v See Utah 
^ Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(e) Interest and Costs to be Included in the 
% Judgment. 
•'-'The clerk must include in any judgment signed by 
him any interest on the verdict or decision from the 
time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have 
been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within 
, two days after the costs have been taxed or ascen-
- amed, in any case where not included in the judg-
- ment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the Register of Actions and in 
the Judgment Docket. 
RULE 55. DEFAULT 
(a) Default. 
(b) Judgment. 
* (c) Setting Aside Default. 
(d) Plaintiffs, Counterciairaants, Cross-Claimants. 
(e) Judgment Against the State or Officer or Agency 
-Thereof. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
Rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall 
enter his default. " - ^  *"- .** ' 
(2) Notice to Party in Default. After the entry of 
the default of any party, as provided in subdivision 
(a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give 
such party in default any notice of action taken or 
to be taken or to serve any notice or paper other-
, wise required by these rules to be served on a party 
to the action or proceeding, except as provided in 
Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is 
'necessary for the court to conduct a hearing with 
regard to the amount of damages of the non-
defaulting party. , 
(b) Judgments 
' . Judgment by default may be entered as follows: * 
7.(1) By the Clerk. 
'When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is 
for a sum certain or for a sum which can by com-
putation be made certain, and the defendant has 
been personally served otherwise than by publication 
or by personal service outside of this state, the cleric 
upon request of the plaintiff shall enter judgment 
,for the amount due and costs against the defendants 
-if he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person, z * * ^«/ ~ "* 
-7 12) By the Court. ; ' . ^ r ; * •-< -J \: 
Vln all other cases the party entitled to a judgment 
by default shall apply to the court therefor. Iff?£v 
order to enable the court to enter judgment OTJS3 
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an accotigf| 
or to determine the amount of damages or to estaSi 
biish the truth of any averment by evidence o r i ^ 
make an investigation of any other matter, the colmg 
may conduct such hearings or order such referenc ~" 
as it deems necessary and proper.,- &-) % <e';<rkr\ 
(c) Setting Aside Defaul t ; ^ ' ^ ^ 1 ^ ^ ? * 
* For good cause shown the'eourt ma7 set aside j _ 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default haf^ i 
been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance^ 
with Rule 60(b). - • - £ / > " * * • * - l ^ ^ F . 4 ^ ^ ^ 
(d) Plaintiffs, Counterclaimants, Cross-Claimants?^ 
. The provisions of this Rule apply^ whether JShe? 
party entitled to the judgment by default is a~piaiSf 
naff, a third-party plaintiff, or "a party who'has? 
pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases^ 
a judgment by default is subject to the limitations 'hf\ 
Rule 54(c). ,J~*\ «*- * * T" ' *V/-! ~*' -!*«*> *'r*«3jgj 
(e) Judgment Against the State or Officer or Agencyj 
.Thereof. . v . ..%,, ;. 1 -„-- , .< , - ;S.*;S$| 
. No judgment by default shall be entered againsy 
the State of Utah or against an officer or agencyj 
thereof unless the claimant establishes
 vhis claim ^  off 
right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
RULE SG. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For Claimant. 
(b) For Defending Party. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense 
Required. 
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. 
(g) Affidavit* Marf# In RaH Faith. 
(a) For Claimant. 
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counter 
rclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 
twenty days from the commencement of the action" 
or after service of a motion for summary judgment^ 
by the adverse party, move with or without suppo-^ 
rtmg affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor' 
upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For Defending Party. 
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is 
sought, may, at any time, move with or without; 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to ail or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. 
The motion shall be served at least ten days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve oppo^ 
sing affidavits/The judgment sought shall be rend-
ered forthwith if the plea.rim.gs> depositions; answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to- a judgment as a matter 
of law. "A summary judgment, -interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. . ^ju-^Ta-it . 's . u.^-7-W«nr*ff 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. .tZwJW 
If on motion under this Rule judgment is 'not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief 
asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
400 • A ^ O " For NNOTATIONS, please consult the UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS Code m Co Pwo. Uca* 
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• hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings 
and the evidence before it and by interrogating 
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material 
facts exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith contr-
overted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying 
the' facts that appear without substantial controv-
ersy, including the extent to which the amount of 
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as 
. are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so 
specified shail.be deemed established, and the trial 
Shall be conducted accordingly. 
' (e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense * 
';. Required. 
;;: Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made 
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated' therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or-parts thereof referred to in 
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served the-' 
rewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or. further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and suppo-
rted as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
"pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as oth-
erwise provided in this Rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. 
.Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify 
his opposition, the court may refuse the application 
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken 
or discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. 
Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at 
any time that any of the affidavits presented purs-
uant to this Rule are presented in bad faith or solely 
for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith 
order the party employing them, to pay to the other 
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which 
the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, 
including reasonable attorney's fees^ and any offe-
nding party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of 
contempt. 
RULE 57. DECLARATORY JUDGxMENTS 
.-The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment pursuant to chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 
1953, shall be in accordance with these Rules, and 
the right to trial by jury may be demanded under 
the circumstances and in the manner provided in 
Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate 
remedy does not preclude a judgment for declara-
tory relief in cases where it is appropriate. The court 
may order a speedy hearing of an action for a dec-
laratory judgment and may advance it on the cale-
ndar. 
RULE 58A. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
(•) Judgment Upon the Verdict of a Jury. 
(b) Judgment in Other Cases. 
(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation ia Register of 
— Actions and Judgment Docket 
C o d e • C o -'-•• -,- -
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(d) Notice of Signing or Entry of Judgment. 
(e) Judgment After Death of a Party. 
(f) Judgment by Confession. 
(a) Judgment Upon the Verdict of a Jury. 
• Unless the court otherwise directs and subject to 
the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the 
verdict of a Jury shall be forthwith signed by the 
clerk" and filed. If there is a special verdict or a 
general verdict accompanied by answers to interro-
gatories returned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49,'the 
court shall direct the appropriate judgment which 
shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed.; 
(b) Judgment in Other Cases. 
-Except, as provided in subdivision (a) hereof and 
subdivision (b) (1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be 
signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of 
. Actions and Judgment Docket.; 
A judgment is complete and shall be deemed 
j entered for all purposes* except the creation of a 
I lien on real property, when the same is signed and 
I filed as herein above provided.' The clerk shall' 
immediately make a notation of the judgment in the 
register of actions and the judgment docket. * 
(d) Notice of Signing or Entry of Judgment. 
The prevailing party shall promptly give notice "of 
the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties 
and shall file proof of service of such notice with 
the clerk of the court. 
(e) Judgment After Death of a Party. 
If a party dies after a verdict or decision upon 
I any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment 
I may nevertheless be rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by Confession. 
Whenever a judgment by confession is authorized 
by statute, the party seeking the same must file with 
the clerk of the court in which the judgment is to be 
I entered a statement, verified by the defendant, to 
| the following effect: 
I (1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money 
due or to become due. It shall concisely state the 
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is justly 
due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the 
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contin-
gent liability, it must state concisely the claim and 
that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the 
same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a 
specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the stat-
ement, and enter in the judgment docket, a judg-
ment of the court for the amount confessed, with 
costs of entry, if any. 
RULE 58B. SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
(a) Satisfaction by 0*n«r or Attorney. 
<b) Satisfaction by Order of Court. 
(c) Entry by Clerk. 
(d) Effect of Satisfaction. 
(e) Filing Transcript of Satisfaction in Other Counties. 
(a) Satisfaction by Owner or Attorney. 
; A judgment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, ^ 
[ as to any or all of the judgment debtors,.by the_ 
| owner thereof, or by the attorney of record of the 
judgment creditor where no assignment of the jud-
gment has been filed and such attorney executes 
' such satisfaction within eight years after the entry of 
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is. tendered here-
ciplinary action, --y; v>.. *'• %c-
'• -2. Extraordinary fee of $__ 
• with. vv>j— ,--•; ^  ± ^ ^ , vV ;^-:-:*f -7.::/>.: •••i.^:-;-- .::?:' 
• • - 3 . A reliable - estimate of • trial days "needed is 
days and undersigned will be available for 
trial on the following dates:_ 
"•;•;v DATED this---' '• day of-l_jjl9^]{»y•>.,:£:Y*-t 
^ : ;SK£££ ^ * ? ^ i £ ^ n >&: ^ ' ^ f ? ^ f t 5 # ^ : d X : - -
••>'*^:'*^Jr%;i:;.Attorney for "J'. '. '31 i-^ TT -^'. 
-. '.
:
"-*'-'^'*
rr
 'I'TeleDhone: ' "'• ~-l-:_f. i""".''"''.'^'^^.-/.. , c-* * —.« > Telephone: . • -s ,.--!*,: 
; .^ENDORSEMENTBY ADVERSE COUNSEL^"* 
.', '."l acknowledge that the foregoing Request for 
v'Firm-Set:. 100-Day Civil - Calendar Trial Setting* 
. is being made and my estimate of trial days needed 
';'-"•"-'" days. The following are dates 100 days in 
' the future which I have available for trial: "' ' ^ :.'•-*•-
''.DATED this! 1 day of _ ; 19_.*; V1; 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT! 
•;<i*V&$ COURT ':M'^ 
RULES OF PRACTICE 
Rule 1. Assignment of C a s e s / r ^ ^ f ^ f ' ^ ^ V ^ J ^ 
Rule 2. Law ami Motion Calendar. ^-^z*^'**^^&if% 
Rule 3. Limitation on Discovery and Motions. "'&*~*&?ifjfa 
Rule 4. Written Orders, Judgments and Decrees; ^»*J*2*g| 
Rule 5. Pretrial Calendar, v ;:.'••:..':" ." * : * ; - ^ ; ^ P » ^ 3 a § 
Role 6. Jury Trials - Civil, •"^•'^••p^--^.-? ^ - ^ 3 ; i 3 t 3 g g 
Rule 7. Motions for Supplemental Proceedings. ^M^-??^§5 
Rule S. Domestic Relations Commissioner. ^ f r~^*A*^?| 
Rule 9. Probate. ->-;.+^\ ,^-r*-~"'-^rf-"'""*/s;W| 
Rule 10. Adoptions.. - ;.--*/-. •.-,, ,\ •-•:.--.-' .• -r;: ~-:v-«-v»»^ 
Rule 11. Time and Manner of Appeals from the G r m i t - ^ 
Court. . 
NOTE: The Third Judicial District Court requests ^ 
•'_. that attorneys include their Bar License Number M< 
.on all pleadings. 
. The following local rules of the Third Judicial 
District Court modify and supplement the Rules of 
Practice in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of 
the State of Utah promulgated on June 30, 1983," 
and rescind the local rules of the Third Judicial 
District Court effective January 1, 1976. These rules 
are effective as of April 1, .1984. ...} \ \.. • y • - ,-.• • ~ - %$ 
RULE 1. ASSIGNMENT OF CASES. 'r'P*?Km:M 
( a ) C i v i l : . *•;• \ : - ; _; ' - : •--. ; ' : : ••"• ; ; " r . ; : k ' ^ 
All civil and domestic relations cases filed in Salt 
Lake County shall be assigned on a random basis at 
the time of filing to an individual judge who will 
hear all matters in the assigned case. .. . •'.• **•;*• y vjv 
(b) Criminal: \ . ;" '*. : ; ;::;;; ; v - • ./> ^ 
All criminal matters filed 6a or after July 1, 1984 
in Salt Lake County shall-be assigned on-a random 
basis at the time of filing to an individual judge who 
will hear all matters in the assigned case, excepting 
that arraignments will be heard by an arraigning 
judge each Friday at 9r:00 a.m. or at such other time 
as the court orders, and thereafter referred to the 
assigned judge for further disposition.~; *:; *: 7 * *";v<j 
(c) Any pleading filed in a criminal or civil case 
after the case has been assigned to a judge must 
have the name of the judge who has been assigned 
to the case on the face of the pleading below the 
number of the case. .;^ ••-» .•-. **-.; ->'...•„ ,."*-,-'- - -i-'-r* ."-Vj 
(d) When the judge assigned to a case is unavail-
able to consider ex parte and emergency matters' for 
a period exceeding one work day the absent judge's 
clerk will inform counsel of a judge authorised to 
handle such matters. Other judges will not consider 
proposed orders on cases not assigned to them, 
except upon a showing of exceptional circumstances 
which in the interest of justice require immediate-
action. •':'-• "r^ -\'[' v^"-*^ '"' ''''£~~~J.~:*4L'".V-::^1 jiJ." -H 
(e) Stipulated or default orders "pursuant to the 
Spouse Abuse Act which are a result of a hearing 
before the Domestic Relations Commissioner, may 
be presented to any judge for signature. : ^ - r'^tcS^Z 
RULE 2. LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR, v ? . 
Rule 2,7 and 2.8 of the Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts and Circuit Courts of "the State of 
Utah shall not apply to motions filed in the<Third 
Judicial District Courtl. .'.'v.:!1:^—-^^^~Srf^T^^, 
;".(a) All law and* motion matters will be heard by 
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'4frC judge assigned to the case. These matters will be 
S'jct on a regular law and motion calendar as arra-
nged with the.clerk, of .the judge assigned to the 
Incase. Ex parte matters based upon stipulation will be 
% presented only to the judge assigned to the case, s;-v,;
 r 
J^./b,) Counsel shall contact the court and receive* a 
Fdate for hearing, on the regular law and motion 
£calendar,.~or may file.a written'request that the 
I matter be resolved without hearing based-upon the 
£ briefs submitted. ^•-. ^jls^zx&^u^--£\F\%V--
^ (c) Orders to show cause and other matters requ-
iiring written notice will be heard only after written 
«: notice, which shall be served not less than five (5), 
I days prior to the date specified in the notice for 
J bearing, unless the court for good cause shown shall 
|by order shorten the time for notice of hearing.* ;•>,,-;-.' 
| 4 (d) Motions based upon depositions or supported 
.5 thereby shall .not be heard unless the depositions are 
? filed in the clerk's office at least forty-eight (48) 
* hours before the hearing on the said motion. ./•. „.~\ -v 
r>l'(ej Affidavits not filed within the time required by 
Uhe Utah Rules of Civil .Procedure, shall not be rec-
eived, except on stipulation of the parties or for 
r
 good cause shown. Courtesy copies of all affidavits 
••. shall be given to the judge within the time limits 
>frequired by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
:• shall indicate the date upon which the matter is set 
for hearing. Such copy shall be clearly marked as a 
courtesy copy, and shall not be filed with the clerk 
of the court. 
;.. (0 All motions except uncontested or ex pane 
matters may be accompanied by a brief statement of 
points and authorities, and any affidavits relied 
upon in support thereof. Points and authorities 
supporting or opposing a motion shall not exceed 
five (5) pages in length, exclusive of the statement of 
material facts as hereinafter, provided, except as 
waived by order of the court, on ex parte applica-
tion. ' . 
(g).The points and authorities in support of a 
dispositive motion shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to 
which the movant contends no genuine issue exists. 
The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sen-
tences, and shall refer with particularity to those 
portions of the record upon which the movant 
relics. 
(h) The points and authorities in opposition to a 
dispositive motion shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to 
which the party contends a genuine issue exists. 
Each fact in dispute shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences, and shall refer with particula-
rity to those portions of the record upon which the 
opposing party relies and, if applicable, shall state 
the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's 
facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth 
in the statement of the movant shall be deemed 
admitted for die purpose o f summary judgment, i 
unless specifically controverted by the statement of 
the opposing party. •-•'"•- _'•;:_. ;.'. ; ; ; : , ;; - • ' . ** '-.*: 
~(i) If a memorandum of points and authorities is 
filed in support of a motion it must be served on the 
opposing party or his counsel and filed with the 
court no later than ten (10) days before the date set 
for hearing. If a responsive memorandum is filed it 
shall be served upon the opposing party or counsel 
no later than five (5) days, before the date of 
hearing. ":•.*_.>•>: ;?;;..:>-., . i -^  '• i. -.' :-.- : > 5 - J 
* (j) A courtesy copy of all memoranda of.points 
and authorities filed by counsel shall be served upon 
the judge hearing the matter at least forty-eight 
t Local Rules RULE 4 
(48) hours before the date set for hearing, .and. shall, 
indicate the date upon which,the matter is set for 
hearing. Such copy shall be clearly marked as a-
courtesy copy, and shall, not be filed'with the clerk 
ofthecourt.. 
! ,_,..(Jc) The court m civil matters, on jt5 motion.or at a 
j party's request may direct argument of any motion 
by telephone conference ..without court appearance.' 
r A verbatim record shall be made of all such telep-
hone arguments and the rulings thereon jf requested 
by any counsel. "" 
RULE 3. LIMITATION ON DISCOVERY AND 
. MOTIONS. .. 
- (a) The parties conducting discovery, \inder Rules 
l: 33, 34 and 36 of the Utah" Rules of Civil "Procedure 
shall not file Interrogatories or Requests with the 
court, but• shall file only a certificate "of'service, 
stating" that such Interrogatories or - Requests have 
I been served on the other parties and-the date bf 
such service, /^^•jurv^r ~?r^*\*L?s7r"M'm3*^'zxiz.r 
-.The party serving* the Interrogatories or Requests 
shall retain the original thereof with the original 
proof of service affixed to it, and serve a copy of 
the interrogatories or Requests and the proof of'. 
service upon the opposing party or his counsel. The 
party responding to the Interrogatories or Requests 
shall serve original responses made under oath with 
the original proof of service affixed to it which shall 
be retained by the party serving the Interrogatories 
or Requests. The written Interrogatories or Requests 
and any responses thereto shall not be filed unless 
the court on motion and notice and for good cause " 
shown so orders. * ....,.-• •. .,„ . . ...» ._
 : 
. (b) Any party filing a Motion to Compel compli-
ance with any discovery, or a Motion relying upon 
such discovery shall attach a copy of the Interroga-
tories, Requests or Answers at issue in such Motion. * 
(c) All parties shall be entitled as a matter of right 
to conduct discovery proceedings in accordance with 
this rule. All discovery proceedings shall be compl-
eted, including all responses thereto, and all depos-
itions and other documents filed with the court no 
later than thirty (30) days before the date set for 
trial of the case. The right to conduct discovery 
proceedings within thirty (30) days before trial shall 
be within the discretion of the court. Motions to 
conduct discovery within thirty (30) days before trial 
shall be presented to the judge assigned to the case 
upon notice to the other parties in the action. In -
exercising its discretion the court shall take into 
consideration the necessity and reasons for such 
discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of the 
parties seeking such discovery, whether the permit-
ting of such discovery will prevent the case from 
going to trial on the date set, or result in prejudice 
to any party. Nothing herein' shall preclude or limit 
voluntary exchange of information or discovery by 
stipulation of the parties at any time prior to the 
date set for trials but in no event shall such excha-
nges or stipulations require a court to grant a cont-
inuance of the trial date. •-;?—";':—. .2. -•:. '• *-*< • V>* -
• * (d) All motions for summary judgment or other 
dispositive motions must be heard at least thirty (30) 
days before the date set for trial. No such motion 
shall be heard after that date without leave of court. 
RULE 4. WRITTEN ORDERS, JUDGMENTS '*• ^ 
AND DECREES. ••• •.•- . -•• ---•v.W'T. ~^ VTJ 
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District 
Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah shall 
not apply in the Third Judicial District Court. „7if^r-
. (a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party 
Pw^#uS For ANNOTATIONS, coosuit th« UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 483 
EjgU . . - , _ . — 
L$rig the credibility of the witness. The court 
| . in the exercise of discretion,' permit inquiry 
rational matters as if on direct examination..; •,;!:-? 
Fading questions, ^f^.^f^^^^^^r^--
Riding questions should not be /used,.on the 
|>j examination of a witness except as "may be•] 
L a^ry to develop r his -.testimony. .^ Ordinarily 
EjT questions .should be permitted on cross-
L^nation.. When a "party'.calls a hostile witness, 
Inverse party, or'a witness identified .with'an 
Erie party, interrogation *may
 ube .*by leading | «Pr . . - r . -... ^Lr.»-./i: . .;.-• •vJi.ir> :**-~*,< -^ ' -v'1''--.. «. _ 
gspons.- -r^^-^r^Y;--*^^^-^^^^1 ^ ^ i - ^ i ^ 
^ 6 1 2 ! WRITING USED TO REFRESH •y.-feSi 
f^0Ry.*-V;is^:^O,Vi^-j ^ ^ . ^ c y ^ V W : 
[I I witness uses a-writing to refresh his memory 
Kfce purpose of testifying, either :L v^>;?ii; -^>-f \.jr*:ff 
EH while testifying, or. i^;n'-;?r ^ f e ^ y ^ * * ^ ^ 
| | j before testifying, if the court in its discretion 
Splines it is necessary in the interests of justice, 
j^ Sn,::~ 2 «Ll-V.16.iJ^ br.'ji'fi cors'tf^ u i^sti:;-'J«^ ~VS*»W-
Ijprerse party is entitled to have the writing pro-" 
Egji-at; the hearing, ' to inspect' it,, to. cross-
terne the witness thereon, and to introduce in 
|§5e. those portions which relate to the testi-
t&fof the witness. If it is claimed that the writing 
IJgns matters not related to the subject matter of 
Kfeimony the court shall examine the writing in 
pel,''excise any portions not so related,' and 
^'delivery of .the remainder to the party entitled 
prb". Any portion withheld over objections shall 
E&tserved and made available to the appellate 
Eln the event of an. appeal. If a writing is not ctd or delivered pursuant to order under this 
ICthe court shall make any order justice requires, 
ERjt' that in criminal cases when the prosecution 
Moot to comply, the order shall be one striking 
gMeiimony or, if the court in its discretion dete-
pos that the interests of justice so require, decl-
mjti mistrial. 
K2tt3.'PRIOR STATEMENTS OF 
|l£NESSES. 
witness concerning prior statement. 
Hbfciwc evidence of prior inconsistent statement of 
mtJL 
Jttmining witness concerning prior statement. 
fejpsamining a witness concerning a prior state-
P8*?ade by him, whether written or not," the 
Tpent need not be shown nor its contents disci-. 
S& h^ini at that time, but on request the same 
^|c shown or disclosed to opposing counsel. 
Kuies 01 Jriviaence RULE 705 
w*m- ^ , C evidence of prior inconsistent statement 
liJWtaess, 
K s f ! ^ evidence of a prior inconsistent state-'. 
13jPw a witness is not admissible unless the 
EPJj* afforded an opportunity to explain or 
same and the opposite party is afforded an 
*
ltv
 to interrogate him thereon, or the int-
*v~ justice otherwise require. This provision 
•°* apply t0 admissions of a party-opponent 
..» Rule 801(d)(2). 
miHl: CAL^ING AND INTERROGATION 
ggrpNESSES BY COURT. 
B S ^ * W court. 
°» by court. 
• ^ court, r ' 
"Vof may' 0 0 liS o w n m o t i o n o r a t t n c "su8-
>*>lDa2y^call witnesses, and all parties are 
entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called. - . . .^1^ 
(b) Interrogation by court. '^ VVr'*'-V*vi^ ^:^ '^r i^^ f? 
' .The court may -interrogate '.witnesses,' [whether 
calledby itself or by a party."/^ .•/•>v* j ' 4 0 4 ' - * i . ' ^ '*»/ 
(c) Objections. VV" S / % ^ 
Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court 
or to interrogation by it may be made at the time or . 
at the next available opportunity when the jury is] 
RULE 615. EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES.*«»*Si^ 
/^ At the request of a party the court shall 'order ; 
witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the tes-
timony of other witnesses,: and it may make the 
order of its own motion. This rule does notautho-^ 
rize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person,'-
or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not^  
a natural person designated as its representative by 
its attorney/or (3) a person whose presence is shown ^  
by a party to be essential to the presentation of his ] 
cause: 
ARTICLE Vn. 
TESTIMONY 
OPINIONS AND EXPERT 
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony oy Lay witnesses.; 
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts^ - : 
Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts. , 
Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue. . 
Rule 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert 
Opinion. 
Rule 706. Court Appointed Experts. 
RULE 701. OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY 
!j WITNESSES. _:IJ.„. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his 
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is 
limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness 
and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his test-
imony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS. 
If scientific, technical, 'or other specialized kno-_ 
wledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge,'skill, experi-
ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
RULE 703: BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY 
.BY EXPERTS. 
The facts or data in the particular case upon 
which an expert bases an opinion or inference may 
be those perceived by or made known to him at or 
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject,- the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence. ^r^srahsS -j 
RULE 704. OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE.^ " 
'Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by, the trier 
Of fact. • ^  *-;•->•- ' ^ V . 1 ':"..i-R-^v^ iTS i 'V-
RULE 705. DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA 
UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION, ix'rfi-tf&t 
•-The expert may testify in terms of: opinion or 
inference and give his reasons therefor without prior 
disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the 
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any 
event be required to disclose the underlying facts or 
data on cross-examination. u*T.7*iTj;2ij> iii^ti^f-1^ 
For ANNOTATIONS, consult the UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 429 
